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1 
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND 
VISIBILITY PROTECTION UNDER THE 
CLEAN AIR ACT 
NICHOLAS KNOOP* 
Abstract: In 2005, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued 
regulations pursuant to the Clean Air Act requiring states to submit plans to 
address visibility impairment due to air pollution. The regulations directed 
states to consider installing emissions controls at certain stationary sources 
according to five factors, including the cost of compliance. In Oklahoma v. 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit held that EPA lawfully rejected Oklahoma’s plan because the 
state plan failed to follow EPA-promulgated guidelines when determining the 
cost of compliance factor. This Comment argues that the outcome in Oklaho-
ma was correct, however, the court did not apply the appropriate standard of 
review. The appropriate standard of review was to determine whether the state 
plan was reasonable and in compliance with the statute and EPA guidelines. 
EPA rightly rejected Oklahoma’s plan because the plan failed to comply with 
the EPA regulations on cost of compliance calculations. 
INTRODUCTION 
The average natural visual range at the Wichita Mountains in Oklaho-
ma is about 115 miles; however, due to air pollution, the average visual 
range at the national park can be as low as twenty-three miles.1 Air pollu-
tion impairs visibility across the country, evidenced by the fact that the typi-
cal visual range in the United States is about fifteen to thirty miles, or about 
one-third of the natural range of visibility.2 Emissions from power genera-
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2015–2016. 
 1 See Wichita Mountains National Wildlife Refuge: Air Pollution Impacts, U.S. FISH & WILD-
LIFE SERV. [hereinafter Air Pollution Impacts], http://www.fws.gov/refuges/airquality/ARIS/WIMO/
Impacts.html [http://perma.cc/QY8Z-9S4W]. The Wichita Mountain Wilderness Area is located in 
the Wichita Mountains Wildlife Refuge, which encompasses 59,020 acres in Oklahoma. See Wichita 
Mountains: Wildlife & Habitat, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/refuge/Wichita_
Mountains/wildlife_and_habitat/index.html [http://perma.cc/NK6Z-CCNP]. 
 2 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HOW AIR POLLUTION AFFECTS THE VIEW (2006), http://www.
epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-05/documents/haze_brochure_20060426.pdf [http://perma.cc/
8GXK-REK2]. National parks and wildlife areas in the Western United States have one-half to two-
thirds of the visual range that would exist without air pollution, and similar areas in the Eastern 
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tion are a significant contributor to hazy conditions and decreased visibil-
ity.3 For example, among the biggest contributors to visibility impairment at 
the Wichita Mountains is sulfur dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel-fired 
power generation.4 Sulfur dioxide reacts in the air and forms tiny particles 
of sulfate.5 Those particles scatter light and create the “regional haze” that 
obstructs views at national parks and wildlife areas, such as the Wichita 
Mountains.6 
In 1977, Congress added provisions to the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) to 
address the problem of regional haze by declaring as a national goal the 
prevention and remedy of visibility impairment resulting from manmade air 
pollution.7 The visibility provisions aim to eliminate visibility impairment 
at 156 “Class I Federal” areas, including forty-seven national parks, 108 
wilderness areas, and one international park.8 Under the statute, the states 
and the federal government both exercise responsibility for maintaining and 
improving air quality in a framework called cooperative federalism.9 In ac-
cordance with the cooperative federalism framework, the Environmental 
                                                                                                                           
United States have about one-fifth of the visual range that would exist under estimated natural con-
ditions. See Regional Haze Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 35,714, 35,715 (July 1, 1999) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. § 51.308 (2015)). 
 3 See CLEAN AIR MARKET PROGRAMS, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HUMAN HEALTH AND ENVI-
RONMENTAL EFFECTS OF EMISSIONS FROM POWER GENERATION (n.d.) [hereinafter EMISSIONS 
FROM POWER GENERATION], http://www3.epa.gov/captrade/documents/power.pdf [http://perma.cc/
NS34-66XY]. Air pollution is also hazardous to the public health because it can lead to respiratory 
illness and decreased lung function. See id. 
 4 See OKLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, REGIONAL HAZE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN REVISION 
41, 66 (2010) [hereinafter OKLAHOMA REVISED SIP], http://www.deq.state.ok.us/AQDnew/rules
andplanning/Regional_Haze/SIP/index.htm [http://perma.cc/N9LX-K2QV] (follow “RH SIP Chap-
ter I–X” hyperlink). Fossil-fuel fired power generation accounts for over 60% of the total sulfur 
dioxide emissions in Oklahoma. See id. at 41. 
 5 See EMISSIONS FROM POWER GENERATION, supra note 3. Sulfate emissions are the primary 
contributor to visibility impairment over the Wichita Mountains Wilderness. See Air Pollution Im-
pacts, supra note 1. 
 6 See EMISSIONS FROM POWER GENERATION, supra note 3; Air Pollution Impacts, supra note 
1. Regional haze is “visibility impairment caused by geographically dispersed sources emitting 
fine particles and their precursors into the air.” Am. Corn Growers Ass’n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
291 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing 64 Fed. Reg. 35,714). 
 7 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7491(a)(1) (2012); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 658 F.2d 271, 272 (5th Cir. 1981) (describing the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 
and the visibility protections requirements). 
 8 See Guidelines for BART Determinations Under the Regional Haze Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 
39,156, 39,156–39,172 (promulgated at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, app.Y (2015)). The Wichita Mountains 
Wilderness Area is a protected “Class I Federal Area.” See Designations of Areas for Air Quality 
Purposes: Oklahoma, 40 C.F.R. § 81.424 (2015). 
 9 See North Dakota v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 730 F.3d 750, 757 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. de-
nied 134 S.Ct. 2662 (2014) (citing Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 600 F.3d 624, 
625 (D.C. Cir. 2010)) (explaining that the visibility provisions of the Clean Air Act operate under 
the cooperative federalism framework); see infra notes 40–48 and accompanying text. 
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Protection Agency (EPA) establishes air quality standards, and the states 
implement those standards, subject to federal oversight.10 
State governments and private industry have filed suit against EPA 
concerning the federal agency’s rejection of state plans to reduce haze.11 
These challenges generally center on EPA-promulgated plans requiring 
more stringent emission controls, despite state determinations that the con-
trols were not cost effective.12 States and private industry argue that EPA is 
unlawfully seizing power from the states and undermining the cooperative 
federalism framework.13 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
heard one of these challenges in Oklahoma v. United States Environmental 
Protection Agency, when the State of Oklahoma and Oklahoma Gas & Elec-
tric challenged EPA’s plan requiring more stringent sulfur dioxide emission 
controls at two fossil-fuel-fired power plants that contributed to the haze at 
the Wichita Mountains.14 Although some argue that the decision in Oklaho-
ma was improper because the court failed to apply the correct standard of 
review, the court rightly found that EPA had authority to reject the state plan 
because it failed to comply with the statute and federal regulations.15 In do-
                                                                                                                           
 10 See Oklahoma v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 723 F.3d 1201, 1204 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied 134 S.Ct. 2662 (2014); GenOn REMA, LLC v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 722 F.3d 513, 
516 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 11 See Utah ex rel. Utah Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, Div. of Air Quality v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 750 F.3d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir.), reh’g denied (10th Cir. 2014) (dismissing state’s un-
timely challenge to EPA’s regional haze plan for state of Utah); North Dakota, 730 F.3d at 755; 
Oklahoma, 723 F.3d at 1204, 1210; see also Petition for Review at 2, Arizona ex rel. Henry Dar-
win v. USEPA, No. 13-70366 (9th Cir. filed Jan. 31, 2013) (challenging EPA’s regional haze plan 
for Arizona). 
 12 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 13 See Oklahoma, 723 F.3d at 1207 (explaining petitioners’ argument that EPA action usurps 
state authority); see also Brief of Amici Curie of Basin Elec. Power Coop. et al. on Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at 5, Oklahoma, 134 S.Ct. 2662 (No. 13-921), 2014 WL 890913, at *5 (describ-
ing EPA’s action as undermining the cooperative federalism framework); Final Opening Brief of 
Petitioner State of Arizona at 1–5, Arizona ex rel. Henry Darwin, No. 13-70366 (arguing that EPA 
overstepped statutory authority in promulgating federal plan for Arizona); American Chemistry 
Council et al., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule, Approval and Promulgation of Texas and Ok-
lahoma Implementation Plans (April 20, 2015), http://www.ipaa.org/wp-content/uploads/down
loads/2015/05/Regional-Haze-Comments-4.20.15.pdf [http://perma.cc/G256-ZJ2Q] (submitting 
comments to EPA’s proposed implementation plans for Texas and Oklahoma, arguing EPA’s 
action dramatically increases its authority). 
 14 See Oklahoma, 723 F.3d at 1204–26; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; 
Oklahoma; Federal Implementation Plan for Interstate Transport of Pollution Affecting Visibility 
and Best Available Retrofit Technology Determinations, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,728, 81,739 (Dec. 28, 
2011) (finding that installing emissions controls as recommended by EPA would improve visibil-
ity at the Wichita Mountains). 
 15 See Oklahoma Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Oklahoma, 134 S.Ct. 2662 (No. 13-
921), 2014 WL 411561, at *20; Brief of Amicus Curiae States of Arizona et al. at 8–9, Oklahoma, 
134 S.Ct. 2662 (No. 13-921), 2014 WL 1101428, at *8–9. 
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ing so, the court maintained EPA’s crucial role within the cooperative feder-
alism framework.16 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1977, Congress amended the CAA and established the national goal 
of “prevention of any future, and the remedying of any existing, impairment 
of visibility in mandatory Class I Federal areas which impairment results 
from manmade air pollution.”17 Congress directed EPA to promulgate regu-
lations to assure “reasonable progress” towards the national goal by requir-
ing states to submit state implementation plans (“SIPs”) containing emis-
sion limits and other measures necessary to prevent and remedy visibility 
impairment.18 In 1980, EPA issued its first regional haze regulations and in 
1988, began monitoring visibility at national parks.19 In 1990, the CAA was 
amended again to provide EPA with additional research and technical sup-
port to pass more effective haze regulations.20 On July 1, 1999, EPA issued 
its Regional Haze Rule.21 In 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit invalidated certain portions of the Regional Haze Rule, 
and in 2005, EPA subsequently issued a revised Regional Haze Rule.22 The 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 U.S. 461, 485 (2004); 
Oklahoma, 723 F.3d at 1207–08, 1210. 
 17 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95–95, sec. 128, § 91, Stat. 685, 742 
(1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7491(a)(1) (2012)), https://history.nih.gov/research/downloads/
PL95-95.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8WM-7QP3]. “Prior to 1977, the [CAA] did not elaborate on the 
protection of visibility as an air-quality related value.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 658 F.2d 271, 272 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 18 See 91 Stat. at 742–43 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7491(a)(4) and (b)(2)); see also Am. Corn 
Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 291 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (discussing amend-
ments to the Clean Air Act). States are required to submit SIPs to address EPA promulgated air 
quality standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1). Generally, SIPs are required to contain information 
such as emission limitations, air quality data, and enforcement programs. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7410(a)(2)(A)–(C) (2012). If EPA revises or promulgates new air quality standards, states must 
submit SIP revisions addressing the updated air quality standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(H) 
(2012). 
 19 See Am. Corn Growers Ass’n, 291 F.3d at 3 (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 80,084 (Dec. 2, 1980)); Re-
gional Haze Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 35,714, 35,718 (Jul. 1, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51.308), 
https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/caaa/t1/fr_notices/rhfedreg.pdf [https://perma.cc/U59K-33K2]; ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET: FINAL REGIONAL HAZE REGULATIONS F PROTECTION OF VISIBILITY 
IN NATIONAL PARKS AND WILDERNESS AREAS 2 (1999), http://www3.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/t1/fact_
sheets/hazefs2.pdf [http://perma.cc/T78U-QJGU]. 
 20 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, sec. 816, § 104 Stat. 2399, 
2695-97 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7492 (2012)). 
 21 See Regional Haze Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. at 35,714. 
 22 See Am. Corn Growers Ass’n, 291 F.3d at 8–9 (holding that EPA’s bifurcated approach on 
how to consider the best available retrofit technology factors was contrary to the Clean Air Act); 
70 Fed. Reg. 39,104 (July 6, 2005). 
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revised rule required all states to submit revised implementation plans to 
EPA by December 17, 2007.23 
In January 2009, EPA found that Oklahoma failed to submit an imple-
mentation plan by the deadline. 24  This finding triggered EPA’s duty to 
promulgate its own federal implementation plan (“FIP”) for the state within 
two years.25 Before EPA submitted the FIP, however, Oklahoma submitted a 
revised SIP in February of 2010.26 On March 22, 2011, EPA proposed to 
partially approve and partially disapprove the SIP.27 In the same action dis-
approving part of the SIP, EPA proposed a FIP to account for the disap-
proved portions of the SIP.28 After a public notice and comment period, EPA 
published its final plan on December 28, 2011 (the “Final Rule”).29 
EPA disapproved part of Oklahoma’s SIP because it did not properly 
consider certain statutorily required cost factors.30  Specifically, EPA be-
lieved that the SIP overestimated the costs of installing emission control 
technology on four units at Oklahoma Gas & Electricity’s (“Oklahoma 
Gas”) Muskogee and Sooner power generating stations.31 The SIP set emis-
sions limits that would not require the use of a certain emission control 
technology because the state determined that the cost of the technology was 
“too high” and the “benefit too low.”32 EPA hired a consultant to calculate 
cost estimates and concluded that the estimated cost of the emission control 
technology was significantly lower than the estimates calculated in the 
SIP.33 Ultimately, EPA’s Final Rule set more stringent sulfur dioxide emis-
                                                                                                                           
 23 See 70 Fed. Reg. at 39,156 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51.308(b) (2015)). 
 24 See Finding of Failure to Submit State Implementation Plans Required by the 1999 Re-
gional Haze Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 2392, 2393 (Jan. 15, 2009). EPA also found that 36 other states, 
the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands failed to submit SIPs. See id. 
 25 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (2012); Oklahoma v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 723 F.3d 1201, 
1205 (10th Cir. 2013) cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 2662 (2014). 
 26 See Oklahoma, 723 F.3d at 1205; OKLAHOMA REVISED SIP, supra note 4. 
 27 See Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Oklahoma; Regional Haze State 
Implementation Plan; Federal Implementation Plan for Interstate Transport of Pollution Affecting 
Visibility and Best Available Retrofit Technology Determinations, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,168, 16,169 
(Mar. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Proposed Rule] (proposing partial approval and partial disapproval of 
Oklahoma’s SIP). 
 28 See Proposed Rule, supra note 27, at 16,168. 
 29 See Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Oklahoma; Federal Implementa-
tion Plan for Interstate Transport of Pollution Affecting Visibility and Best Available Retrofit 
Technology Determinations, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,728, 81,730–31 (Dec. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Final 
Rule] (setting forth final implementation plan for Oklahoma). 
 30 See Proposed Rule, supra note 27, at 16,182. 
 31 See id. The Muskogee plant emitted 16.19% of the total sulfur dioxide emissions at the 
time Oklahoma revised its plan. See OKLAHOMA REVISED SIP, supra note 4, at 41. 
 32 See OKLAHOMA REVISED SIP, supra note 4, at 82. 
 33 See Oklahoma v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 723 F.3d 1201, 1206 (10th Cir. 2013) cert. 
denied 134 S.Ct. 2662 (2014); Proposed Rule, supra note 27, at 16,183. “For example, Oklahoma 
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sions limits than the SIP that required Oklahoma Gas to install the emis-
sions controls it had previously determined to be not cost effective.34 
On February 24, 2012, the State of Oklahoma, along with the Oklaho-
ma Industrial Energy Consumers group, challenged EPA’s Final Rule by 
filing a petition for review in the Tenth Circuit.35 Oklahoma Gas filed a sep-
arate petition for review, and the petitions were consolidated by the court on 
the same day.36 On July 19, 2013, in a 2–1 decision, the court denied the 
petition for review.37 The dissenting opinion concurred with most of the 
majority’s analysis but dissented with respect to certain EPA action in 
promulgating the Final Rule.38 Subsequently, petitioners’ writ of certiorari 
was denied by the United States Supreme Court.39 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the fifty states share 
responsibility for maintaining and improving air quality.40 The Clean Air 
Act (CAA) directs EPA to create national ambient air quality standards 
(“NAAQS”) for pollutants at levels that will protect public health.41 Each 
state is required to submit a state implementation plan (“SIP”) that provides 
for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of EPA’s standards.42 
If EPA finds that a state has failed to submit an adequate plan either in 
whole or in part, the agency is statutorily required to promulgate a federal 
implementation plan (“FIP”) within two years of the determination, “unless 
the State corrects the deficiency” before EPA’s plan becomes final.43 
In the visibility protection provisions of the CAA, Congress estab-
lished the national goal of visibility improvement and directed EPA to 
                                                                                                                           
estimated the cost of the [technology] to be $7,147 per ton of SO2 removed at one of the Sooner 
Generating Station units . . . EPA projected [the technology] at that same unit would cost $1,291 
per ton of SO2 removed.” Proposed Rule, supra note 27, at 16,183. 
 34 See Final Rule, supra note 29, at 81,728. 
 35 See Oklahoma, 723 F.3d at 1206. Section 7601 of the Clean Air Act specifies that “[a] 
petition for review of the Administrator’s action in approving or promulgating any implementation 
plan under section 7410 . . . which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit.” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012). 
 36 See Oklahoma, 723 F.3d at 1206. 
 37 Id. at 1204. 
 38 See id. at 1224 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
 39 See Oklahoma v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S.Ct 2662 (2014). 
 40 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410; North Dakota v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 730 F.3d 
750, 757 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 2662 (2014) (citing Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. En-
vtl. Prot. Agency, 600 F.3d 624, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 
 41 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–7409; Oklahoma, 723 F.3d at 1204. 
 42 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1). 
 43 See id. § 7410(c). 
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promulgate regulations to further that goal.44 The regulations required states 
to revise their SIPs to contain “emission limits, schedules of compliance, 
and other measures necessary to make reasonable progress toward meeting 
the national visibility goal.”45 States were obligated to determine the best 
available retrofit technology (“BART”) for certain sources of emissions 
built between 1962 and 1977 that may “reasonably be anticipated to cause 
or contribute to any impairment of visibility.”46 The statute required that 
states consider certain factors when making BART determinations, such as 
costs of compliance.47 Congress directed EPA to promulgate guidelines to 
assist states in making BART determinations and required states to follow 
the guidelines for fossil-fuel-fired power plants with a total generating ca-
pacity greater than 750 megawatts.48 
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides the standards of re-
view for evaluating EPA action under the CAA.49 The APA requires courts 
to set aside agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”50 Agency action is con-
sidered arbitrary or capricious if: 
“… the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not in-
tended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important as-
pect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Id. § 7491(a)(1). 
 45 Id. § 7491(b)(2); see Regional Haze Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 51.308 (2015). 
 46 See 42 U.S.C. § 7491(b)(2)(A). BART is “an emission limitation based on the degree of 
reduction achievable through the application of the best system of continuous emission reduction 
for each pollutant which is emitted by . . . [a BART-eligible source].” Guidelines for BART De-
terminations Under the Regional Haze Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 39,156, 39,156–39,172 (promulgated at 
40 C.F.R. pt. 51, app.Y (2015)). 
 47 42 U.S.C. § 7491(g)(2). The statute lists four other factors to consider: the energy and non-
air quality environmental impacts of compliance, any existing pollution control technology in use at 
the source, the remaining useful life of the source, and the degree of improvement in visibility 
which may reasonably be anticipated to result from the use of such technology. Id. The CAA re-
quires that EPA consider these factors and follow the promulgated guidelines when determining 
BART for an FIP. Id. 
 48 Id. § 7491(b)(2)(B); 40 C.F.R. § 51.308(e); 40 C.F.R. Pt. 51, App. Y; see also WildEarth 
Guardians v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 759 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that the 
BART guidelines are “merely advisory for smaller plants.”). 
 49 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conser-
vation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 U.S. 461, 496 (2004) (applying APA to EPA action under 
CAA); US Magnesium, LLC v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 690 F.3d 1157, 1164 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(applying APA to EPA action under CAA). The CAA also provides standards of review for EPA 
action, but the arbitrary and capricious standard is “the same as that used under the [APA].” North 
Dakota v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 730 F.3d 750, 758 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 
2662 (2014) (citing EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 696 F.3d 7, 23 
(D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d and remanded 134 S.Ct. 1584 (2014)). 
 50 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
8 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 43:E. Supp. 
runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausi-
ble that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the 
product of agency expertise.”51 
Under this standard, a court must determine whether the agency “consid-
ered the relevant data and rationally explained its decision.”52 
The United States Supreme Court established the analytical framework 
for reviewing a federal agency’s interpretation of a statute in Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.53 In Chevron, the 
Court was asked to review EPA regulations defining the term “stationary 
source.”54 In evaluating whether EPA’s interpretation of the statute was con-
trary to law, the Supreme Court explained that first, a court must determine 
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”55 If 
the statute is clear and unambiguous, a court applies the statute’s plain 
meaning and the inquiry ends.56 If the intent of Congress is unclear or am-
biguous, a court will defer to the agency’s construction of the statute, so 
long as it is reasonable.57 Where Congress has explicitly delegated rule 
making authority to an agency to fill the gaps left in a statute, agency regu-
lations are “given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.”58 
After finding that the CAA was unclear and ambiguous as to the defi-
nition of “stationary source,” the Court concluded that the regulation was a 
reasonable interpretation of the statute and therefore deferred to EPA, up-
holding the agency’s definition of the disputed term.59 
In Arizona Public Service Company v. United States Environmental 
Protection Agency, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applied 
the arbitrary and capricious standard and the Chevron framework when it 
reviewed EPA’s action under the CAA.60 Petitioners challenged a federal 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 562 F.3d 1116, 1123 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
 52 See id. at 1122. 
 53 See 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 54 See id. at 840–41. 
 55 Id. at 842. 
 56 See id at 842–43. 
 57 See id. at 843–45. 
 58 See id. at 843–44. A federal agency “qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that 
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and 
that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authori-
ty.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (holding that United States Cus-
toms ruling letters not entitled to Chevron deference because relevant statute did not indicate con-
gressional intent to delegate authority to issue the rulings with force of law). 
 59 See Chevron, 467 at 844–45. 
 60 See 562 F.3d at 1122–23. 
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implementation plan promulgated pursuant to congressionally delegated 
EPA regulations. 61  In discussing Chevron, the Court explained that “an 
agency action is entitled to substantial deference when it acts pursuant to its 
own regulation.”62 The Court found that EPA’s federal plan was not plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with EPA’s regulations, and therefore deferred to 
the agency’s interpretation under Chevron.63 The court also held that EPA 
did not act arbitrarily and capriciously because the agency “identified a reg-
ulatory need and enacted a source-specific federal plan to fill this gap.”64 In 
denying the petition for review, the Court concluded that the disagreement 
between the petitioners and EPA was nothing more than a “difference in 
view.”65 
In Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, the Supreme Court applied the Chevron standard 
when the Court reviewed EPA’s action to issue stop construction orders for 
a new major pollution emitting device permitted by a state agency.66 First, 
the Court confirmed the agency’s authority to review the best available con-
trol technology (“BACT”) determinations for reasonableness because of 
EPA’s “longstanding construction of the [CAA].”67 The Court did not apply 
“dispositive force” to EPA’s interpretation of the statute, however, because 
the agency’s construction of the statute was reflected in internal guidance 
memoranda and was not promulgated with the “force of law.”68 Second, the 
Court upheld the EPA’s action because once the federal agency found that 
the state’s BACT determinations were unreasonable, EPA had the authority 
under the CAA to issue the stop orders.69 Further, the Court held that alt-
hough EPA’s stop orders were not composed with “ideal clarity,” EPA “ade-
quately ground[ed] the determination” that the BACT determinations were 
unreasonable because they lacked evidentiary support.70 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has denied petitions 
for review challenging EPA’s rejection of state BART determinations in two 
similar cases.71 In North Dakota v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See id. at 1118. 
 62 Id. at 1123 (citing Culbertson v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 69 F.3d 465 (10th Cir. 1995)). 
 63 See id. at 1126. 
 64 Id. at 1130. 
 65 Id. at 1130–31. 
 66 See 540 U.S. 461, 468–69 (2004). 
 67 Id. at 495–96. 
 68 See id. at 487–88 (citing Christensen v. Harris Co., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)). 
 69 See id. at 497, 502. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See Nebraska v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 12-3084, 2016 WL 403655, at *5 (8th Cir. 
Feb. 3, 2016); North Dakota v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 730 F.3d 750, 755 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied 134 S. Ct. 2662 (2014). 
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the State of North Dakota, Great River Energy, and two environmental 
groups challenged EPA’s final rule approving in part and disapproving in 
part North Dakota’s regional haze SIP.72 EPA rejected the plan because the 
SIP contained data flaws that did not allow the State to meaningfully con-
sider the cost of compliance factor.73 The Eighth Circuit cited Alaska as per-
suasive analysis in upholding EPA’s action to reject the BART determina-
tions, concluding that EPA lawfully rejected the SIP for failing to consider 
the cost of compliance factor as required by statute.74 The Eighth Circuit 
cited Alaska again in Nebraska v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
where the State of Nebraska disputed EPA’s disapproval of the state’s BART 
determinations at the Gerald Gentleman Station.75 The court denied the peti-
tion for review because Nebraska’s SIP contained costing errors and EPA 
determined that “Nebraska’s action was unreasoned.”76 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Oklahoma v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review 
and held that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had the statutory 
authority under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to review Oklahoma’s state im-
plementation plan (“SIP”).77 The court found that EPA acted lawfully when 
the agency rejected Oklahoma’s SIP and promulgated a federal implementa-
tion plan (“FIP”).78 The court rejected petitioners’ procedural challenge that 
EPA improperly promulgated a FIP in the same action it denied the state 
plan.79 The Tenth Circuit also found that the court did not have jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See 730 F.3d at 755. Specifically, the State and Great River Energy challenged EPA’s dis-
approval of the BART determinations for Coal Creek Station, a fossil-fuel fired power plant 
owned by Great River Energy with generating capacity over 750 megawatts. See id. at 759–61; 
Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; North Dakota; Regional Haze State Imple-
mentation Plan; Federal Implementation Plan for Interstate Transport of Pollution Affecting Visi-
bility and Regional Haze, 76 Fed. Reg. 58,570, 58,619 (Sept. 21, 2011) (explaining that BART 
guidelines were mandatory because Coal Creek Station has a capacity of 1,100 megawatts). 
 73 See North Dakota, 730 F.3d at 760–61. 
 74 See id. at 761. 
 75 See Nebraska, 2016 WL 403655, at *2, *5. The Gerald Gentleman Station is the largest 
source of sulfur dioxide pollution in the state. See id. at *2. 
 76 See id. at *5. 
 77 See 723 F.3d 1201, 1204 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 2662 (2014). 
 78 See id. 
 79 See id. at 1222–24. The court stressed the “high bar” the CAA creates for procedural chal-
lenges. See id. at 1223. 
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to consider petitioners’ challenge to EPA using certain cost estimate calcula-
tions for the first time in its final rule (the “Final Rule”).80 
In holding that EPA acted within its statutory authority when the feder-
al agency reviewed the SIP, the court applied the first step of Chevron and 
found that Congress mandated that EPA “must ensure SIPs comply with the 
statute.”81 Congress expressly delegated rulemaking authority to EPA to 
issue best available retrofit technology (“BART”) guidelines and required 
that states, when making BART determinations at power plants having total 
generating capacity over 750 megawatts, follow those guidelines.82  The 
court found that EPA’s review of a SIP’s compliance with BART guidelines 
was lawful because it was consistent with congressional intent as evidenced 
by the statute’s text and legislative history.83 
In ruling that EPA lawfully exercised its statutory authority to reject 
the SIP and promulgate the FIP in its Final Rule, the court applied the 
standard of review set out in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).84 
These standards require the court to hold unlawful any agency action that is 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with the law.”85 Petitioners argued that EPA acted arbitrarily and capricious-
ly in rejecting the SIP’s cost estimates, and that the FIP cost estimates were 
impermissible because they did not follow the BART guidelines. 86  The 
court found that EPA had a reasonable basis to reject the cost estimates in 
the SIP because the state estimates did not follow EPA guidelines.87 After 
deferring to EPA’s expert and finding that EPA had explained its analysis 
and offered explanations contradicting petitioners’ cost analysis, the Court 
concluded that EPA’s cost estimates in the FIP were not arbitrary and capri-
cious.88 
                                                                                                                           
 80 See id. at 1214–15. The court found that it lacked jurisdiction because petitioners did not 
raise the issue with EPA first through a petition for reconsideration. See id. 
 81 See id. at 1207–08. 
 82 See id. at 1208. 
 83 See id. at 1209–10. 
 84 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012); Oklahoma, 723 F.3d at 1211, 
1224. 
 85 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); Oklahoma, 723 F.3d at 1211. The court was required to determine 
whether EPA “considered the relevant data and rationally explained the decision.” Ariz. Pub. 
Serv. Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 562 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir. 2009). “Agency action is 
arbitrary or capricious ‘if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to 
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for 
its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could 
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.’” Id. at 1123 (quoting 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 86 See Oklahoma, 723 F.3d at 1210–11, 1214. 
 87 See id. at 1212. 
 88 See id. at 1217–22. 
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Following the decision in Oklahoma, EPA has cited the case to support 
its position that the federal agency has authority to review the substance of 
SIPs.89 In contrast, some states have argued that the Oklahoma decision is 
not persuasive authority because it misapplied the standard of review set out 
by the United States Supreme Court in Alaska.90 Broadly speaking, those 
states contend that according to the holding in Alaska, courts must defer to 
state judgments of reasonableness, not EPA’s.91 Further, they allege that 
EPA bears the burden of showing that a state’s BART determinations are 
unreasonable.92 This argument is based on the language in Alaska explain-
ing that when a court reviews an EPA disapproval of a state’s best available 
control technology (“BACT”) determination “the production and persuasion 
burdens remain with EPA and the underlying question a reviewing court 
resolves remains the same: Whether the state agency’s BACT determination 
was reasonable, in light of the statutory guides and the state administrative 
record.”93 
Despite these arguments, the Oklahoma court properly applied the 
analysis in Alaska because the SIP failed to follow the statutorily required 
BART guidelines.94 The flaws in Oklahoma’s cost analysis prevented the 
state from meaningfully considering the cost factor required by the CAA; 
therefore, EPA appropriately determined that the SIP was not “reasonably 
moored” to the statute.95 Additionally, EPA does not bear the burden of 
                                                                                                                           
 89 See Notification of Supplemental Authority, Arizona v. EPA, No. 13-70366 (9th Cir. filed 
July 24, 2014). 
 90 See Brief of Amicus Curiae States of Arizona et al., supra note 15, at 8–9; see also Final 
Opening Brief of Petitioner State of Arizona at 20–21, Arizona ex rel. Arizona Dep’t of Envtl. 
Quality v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 13-70366 (9th Cir. 2015); North Dakota Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari at 25–29, North Dakota v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2662 (2014) (No. 13-940), 
2014 WL 491629, at *25–29. 
 91 See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 15, at 9. This accompanies state arguments that 
EPA is undermining the cooperative federalism framework by unlawfully seizing power from the 
states. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 92 See Oklahoma Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 15, at 20. The dissenting opinion 
in Oklahoma reflects this argument, stating that EPA did not deserve deference because it failed to 
provide evidentiary support for its conclusion to reject the SIP. See 723 F.3d at 1225; see also 
Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 15, at 13 n.7. 
 93 See Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 U.S. 461, 494 (2004); 
Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 15, at 10. 
 94 See Oklahoma, 723 F.3d at 1207–08, 10; see also Nebraska v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
No. 12-3084, 2016 WL 403655, at *3–5 (8th Cir. Feb. 3, 2016); North Dakota, 730 F.3d at 760–
61 (rejecting petitioners’ argument that EPA is required to approve BART determinations “neither 
reasoned nor moored to the CAA’s provisions”). 
 95 See Alaska, 540 U.S. at 485; see also North Dakota, 730 F.3d at 760–61 (rejecting petition-
ers’ argument that EPA is required to approve BART determinations “neither reasoned nor 
moored to the CAA’s provisions”). The Oklahoma decision discusses a number of ways in which 
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showing the unreasonableness of a state’s determinations because the Alas-
ka court limited that portion of the decision to “either an EPA-initiated civil 
action or a challenge to an EPA stop-construction order filed in state or fed-
eral court.”96 By upholding EPA’s action to review and reject the SIP for 
compliance with the statutorily required BART guidelines, the court in Ok-
lahoma preserved EPA’s “limited but vital role” in the cooperative federal-
ism framework.97 
CONCLUSION 
The Environmental Protection Agency’s efforts to implement the visi-
bility protection provisions of the Clean Air Act have been met with various 
court challenges by state governments and private industry across the coun-
try. Although some states fear that the federal agency is undermining the 
cooperative federalism framework by reviewing and rejecting the substance 
of state plans to reduce haze, the Tenth Circuit affirmed EPA’s authority to 
review and reject implementation plans that do not follow the statutory 
guidelines. The decision supports EPA’s vital role in enforcing the visibility 
protection provisions of the Clean Air Act. In doing so, the court ensured 
that visibility at areas such as the Wichita Mountains will improve for years 
to come. 
                                                                                                                           
Oklahoma failed to follow the BART guidelines, such as failing to provide certain documentation 
or not using specific costing methods set out in the regulation. See 723 F.3d at 1212–14. 
 96 Alaska, 540 U.S. at 494. 
 97 See id. at 485, 490–91; Guidelines for BART Determinations Under the Regional Haze 
Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 39,156, 39,156–39,172 (promulgated at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, app.Y (2015)); supra 
note 84–96 and accompanying text. 
